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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20010207-CA
Priority No. 15
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN,
Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

Statement of Jurisdiction
Appellee Dean Allen Mogen contests the State's statement of jurisdiction. As he
argues below, the State has no statutory right to appeal this case.
Statement of Issue Presented for Review,
With Standard of Review
Assuming that the State possesses a right to appeal, the single issue presented for
review and the standard of review governing it are:
Issue. Did the trial court err in granting Mogen's motion to suppress, on grounds
that Mogen's detention exceeded the scope of the original traffic stop, Mogen was not

free to terminate the encounter with police and leave the scene, and police lacked
reasonable suspicion to engage in investigative questioning that led to search of his
vehicle?
Standard of review. In search and seizure cases, the trial court's conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ 7, 17 P.3d
1135, cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). The trial court's findings of fact are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)).
Determinative Constitutional Provisions,
Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(2) (1999).
Statutes are reproduced in full in the Addendum.
Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the Case

A deputy sheriff stopped Mogen for speeding and issued a verbal warning. The
deputy also searched Mogen's vehicle, though there was no reason to do so, after
receiving consent. He found 1.8 grams of methamphetamine and a small torch. Mogen
was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), and one count
of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
2

Ann. § 58-37a-5( 1)(1981)
Course' of Proceedings
The trial court held a preliminary hearing, after which it bound over Mogen on
both counts. Mogen denied the charges and subsequently filed a motion to suppress the
methamphetamine and torch.
C.

Disposition a; i ruhv, ^ ;

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the evidence in question
should be suppressed as a matter of law. Afterwards, upon motion by the State, the
court entered an "order to disi i: liss," disn lissii lg w it! l pi eji idice tl le case agaii ist 1\ logei i
Relevant Facts
Shortly after midnight, on August 22, 2000, Uintah County Deputy Troy Slaugh1
was driving his marked patrol vehicle on an isolated stretch of Highway 40 near Jensen,
Utah. A large flatbed truck approacl led 1 lii i I at ahigl u ate of speed 1 rom the opposite
direction Slaw ti u ned oi 11 lis radar and determined that the truck was traveling 69 miles
per hour in an area where the speed limit had become 50. After they passed, Slaugh
made a U-turn, activated his overhead emergency lights, and pulled the truck over and
made contact »ulli M<>L',em (In; di IWI Moyni \MIS alum: in Ilk1 vohirk\ U "'. "n\"\ r'" I,"13,71.2.71.5-6,71.10.

'Officer Slaugh's name was misspelled in the transcripts of the preliminary hearing
and suppression hearing, and it is misspelled also in the brief of appellant.
3

The truck was owned by Malcolm's Rat Hole, an oil field company, where Mogen
worked as a supervisor. R. 72.10-11, 72.20, 71.11-12. The truck had large flared sides.
R. 71.14. Also, at that time, it was transporting a cell ring. Id. Mogen was one of a
number of company employees who had access to the truck. R. 72.10-11, 72.23. A
locked briefcase in the truck belonged to another employee. R. 72.9-10, 72.26.
Slaugh approached Mogen, seated behind the wheel, and asked for his driver's
license. He then contacted dispatch, which ran routine driver's license and warrants
checks. Mogen, it turned out, possessed a valid driver's license and he had no
outstanding warrants. R. 72.14-15, 71.3. This took some five to ten minutes. R. 72.15,
71.12. During this time, Mogen busied himself by taking out log books in the truck and
filling them out. R. 71.12.
Slaugh returned Mogen's driver's license to him and issued a verbal warning for
speeding. R. 72.4, 72.17, 71.3. What happened next is disputed. Slaugh claimed that
he told Mogen that he was free to leave. R. 72.4, 71.3. But Mogen testified that he did
not recall being told that he could leave, and more to the point, he never heard Slaugh
tell him that. R. 71.13, 71.16. Mogen also testified that Slaugh acted in an unusual
manner after returning his license. Slaugh stared at Mogen "a few seconds," which he
interpreted to mean, "I felt that he [Slaugh] had something more to say." R. 71.14.
It is undisputed that Slaugh turned and took "a couple of steps" toward his patrol
vehicle but then turned back and made contact again with Mogen. R. 72.4, 71.4, 71.8.
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A matter of seconds had passed, "definitely less than ten seconds" by Slaugh's account,

driven away. He did not do so, he testified, because of officer safety. He was concerned
about hitting Slaugh with the flared side of his truck or the cell ring that he was
ti anspoi tii ig R 71 1 1 \ lso, 1 le stated that he believed that he was not free to go. I he
overhead emergency lights oi I Slaugl i's pati c >1 \ ;irel lick • ^ ^ ' ere still oi I ai id flasl lii ig L / Bi it
more than that, "even when [Slaugh had] stepped back, but when he took a step back, he
just, he acted like he still had something he wanted to say to me. ...I could just feel it
diiii idl |ii:>l In Ins iatiiti expressions." i\
Slaugh did have something llv.il

* • •»* • > s:i\ I h: asked Moiien "if hi 'il mind

if! took a look in his vehicle for any illegal drugs, guns, knives or bombs." R. 72.4, 71.4.
There was, Slaugh testified, "no particular reason" for the request. R. 71 A No
* ••'«; :-' -..K.:V
/i.4, 71.15. Slaugh

a- ;i: p-ain viev
• •

•.

f

ogen aereeo .- he search K '2.4,

"t Hi*, Murk :ipJ • 1I"MI I'

hi'-' he concluded

a search. R. 72.4-5, 72.18-19. This search revealed a quantity of methamphetamine in
an Advil bottle in the ashtray, as well as a small torch under the front passenger seat of
tl le tit i ic 1 ;: R 72 5 6, 72 8 I"\ logei i subsequently was arrested and charged with
possession of a controlled substance ai id possessioi i of cli i igparaphen lalia
Summary of the Argument
The Court of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal because the order
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appealed from is an acquittal, which is not appealable under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a1(2). In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the appeal because the State has not
complied with the procedural requirements of the statute.
Absent dismissal, the Court should affirm the trial court's suppression order.
There was no transition from detention to voluntary encounter. Rather, Deputy Slaugh
detained Mogen illegally. Slaugh had no reasonable suspicion to search the truck that
Mogen was driving. Mogen's consent to search was not valid.
Argument
I.

The Court of Appeals should dismiss the
State's appeal because the order appealed
from is an acquittal, which is not appealable
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2). In
the alternative, the Court should dismiss
the appeal because the State has not complied
with the procedural requirements of the
statute.

At the outset it is necessary to determine precisely what the matter is that the
State, as appellant, is attempting to obtain review of in this case. The State's initial brief
is not clear. The State avers in its opening sentence, 'This is an appeal from an order
dismissing" the two misdemeanor drug charges filed against Mogen in district court. Br.
Appellant 1. The State then asserts, in its jurisdictional statement, that this Court may
review the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) ("The Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... over: interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first degree (?r capital
6

felony [.]"). Id. The State finally claims, in its statement of the single issue to be
reviewed, as well as its summary of argument, that the trial court erred in granting
Mogen's motion to suppress the evidence found in the company truck that he was
driving. Id. at 1-2, 4-5. Therefore, we are confronted with three possibilities as to what
the State wishes to appeal. They are: (1) the final judgment of dismissal of the trial
court, (2) the suppression order of the trial court, viewed as an interlocutory decision,
and (3) the suppression order of the trial court, considered independently of the final
judgment of dismissal.
The second possibility may be easily eliminated. Review of the record indicates
that the trial court's suppression order was not an interlocutory decision. R. 56-59. The
fact that the trial court entered an "order to dismiss" the action against Mogen provides
additional evidence for this interpretation. R. 60-62. Further, the State has made no
filings under Utah R. App. P. 5, providing for discretionary appeals from interlocutory
orders. Consequently, it is apparent that the State is seeking appellate review of one of
only two things, either the trial court's final judgment of dismissal or the earlier order of
suppression.
Clarification is essential. The State's right to appeal in criminal cases is not
absolute. Indeed, the State has no right to appeal except as expressly provided by
statute. State v. Kalbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a1(2) (1999) sets forth specific judgments and orders from which the State may appeal.
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The section states in relevant part: "An appeal may be taken from the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; ...(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence when upon petition for review the appellate court decides
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice[.]" If a judgment or order is not of the
type included in the section, it may not be appealed by the State. "[S]ection 77-18a-1(2)
is restrictive rather than permissive and, thus, the State has no right to appeal except as
expressly provided therein." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 n.l (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (citations omitted).
In this context, Mogen contends first that the "order dismissing" the two counts
against him constituted an acquittal, not a final judgment of dismissal. An acquittal is
not appealable by the State.
State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991), is in point. Factually, the case is very similar to this case. Police stopped
Willard at a roadblock to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. Willard
provided officers with valid documents. Subsequently, he consented to search of his
vehicle, during which the officers found a controlled substance. Willard moved to
suppress the evidence. The trial court granted the motion, on grounds that Willard's
continued detention was unconstitutional once the purpose for the roadblock had been
accomplished and his consent to search therefore was irrelevant. Then the trial court
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entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The State appealed. Id. at 190-91.
In Willard, as here, the State specifically sought review of the trial court's
suppression order, arguing that the analysis underlying the order was erroneous. The
Court of Appeals did not consider the State's argument. Rather, the Court dismissed the
appeal, because the trial court acquitted Willard even though it terminated the case by
means of what was labeled as a dismissal. Id. at 191-92. Granting of a motion to
suppress, on occasion, may result in acquittal as opposed to dismissal. Acquittal
definitely lies in drug cases when, without admission of the controlled substance seized,
the State is unable to make out a necessary element and defendant cannot be convicted
of the crime charged. In Willard, the Court of Appeals expressed this principle as
follows: "A ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one
or more of the elements of the offense charged is an acquittal." Id. at 191 (citing United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) and State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064
(Utah 1983)). This principle also finds expression in a well established statute and
equally well established case law in this jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2)
(1999) ("There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in ... a determination that there
was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction."). See also State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d
267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (so-called dismissal based on insufficient evidence is
actually acquittal, which State cannot appeal); State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 588-89
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (acquittal resulting from insufficient evidence is not appealable).
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There are two reasons why the State may not appeal an acquittal. Section 77- 18a1(2) does not authorize the State to appeal such cases. Jackson, 857 P.2d at 268-69.
More basically, however, to permit the State to appeal an acquittal would violate the rule
against double jeopardy. Scott, 437 U.S. at 95-97; Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065;
Jackson, 857 P.2d at 269; Willard, 801 P.2d at 191. This is so even though a trial court
improperly determined the facts or incorrectly applied the law when acquitting a
defendant. Willard, 801 P.2d at 191 (citing Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065).
In this case, the trial court acquitted Mogen when it suppressed evidence and
entered an order of dismissal. It is irrelevant that the case was terminated by what was
called a dismissal. The label attached to a ruling is not determinative of what it is in fact
and whether it is appealable under section 77-18a-1(2). Larsen, 834 P.2d at 589 (citing
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981
(Utah 1993)). Here, the final judgment of dismissal was an acquittal. The earlier
suppression order had the effect of totally gutting the State's case against Mogen.
Because the methamphetamine and torch found in the truck were now inadmissible as
evidence, the State could not prove that Mogen actually possessed a controlled
substance or drug paraphernalia. It could not, in other words, make out necessary
elements in either of the two statutes that Mogen was accused of violating, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37a-5(l). The prosecutor in the case admitted as much
when he stated in his motion to dismiss:

10

2.

[T]he Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, concluding that the officer did not have a legal
basis to perform a search, thereby suppressing the
evidence.

3.

Without the evidence, the State cannot proceed with
the case.

R. 62. The methamphetamine and torch were the sine qua non of the State's case.
Without them, the State had no case.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should reach the same result that it did in
Willard. There the Court held, "Without the admission of the controlled substance
seized in the search of Willard's truck, there could be no conviction of the crime
charged, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. [AJlthough
labeled a dismissal, the order appealed from is an acquittal and not a 'dismissal'.... The
[State's] appeal is therefore dismissed." Willard, 801 P.2d at 192. Here, the State's
appeal also should be dismissed. The State is attempting to appeal from what clearly is
an acquittal under section 76-1-403(2) and extant case law in this jurisdiction. Section
77-18a-1(2) does not authorize such appeals. Further, the rule against double jeopardy
shields Mogen against further State action on the same charges.
In the alternative, Mogen contends that the State's appeal should be dismissed
because the State has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 7718a-1(2). This assumes, for purposes of argument, that the trial court's final judgment of
dismissal does not constitute an acquittal.
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State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 (Utah 1985), began the process of imposing
certain procedural requirements upon the State in cases where it seeks to appeal adverse
suppression orders at the trial court level. In Waddoups, as in this case, the trial court
suppressed key evidence, the State decided that it could not proceed against defendant,
and then as a matter of strategy it requested and received an order of dismissal that it
immediately appealed. The Supreme Court held that the State's appeal was improper
and dismissed it in a brief, unanimous decision. At issue was language in Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(c), now repealed, as opposed to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(5), now repealed
as well.2 Rule 26 permitted an appeal of right by the prosecution from a "final judgment
of dismissal." On the other hand, section 77-35-26 did not permit an appeal from an
order granting a pretrial motion to suppress as a matter of right but only "when, upon a
petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal would be in the
interest of justice." Faced with this conflict, the court opined that "The State has
attempted to circumvent this Court's discretion to grant or deny petitions for review ... by
requesting a dismissal and relying on ... Rule 26(c)...." It also stated its rationale for
dismissing the State's appeal: "It is clear ... that the State wishes to have this Court
review, not the trial court's order of dismissal, but the earlier order of suppression. To
allow an appeal of right in such a circumstance would give the State an appeal of right

2

As is apparent, section 77-18a-1(2) contains language that is identical to what
previously was contained in rule 26 and section 77-35-26.
12

from virtually every adverse pretrial order. That result would be inconsistent with our
law and would be a distortion of the language and intent of [section 77-35-26]." Id. at
224.
Eight years later, in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993), defendant
attempted to rely on Walloups in arguing that the State's appeal should be dismissed.
There, as here, the trial court suppressed evidence, the State determined that it could not
prosecute defendant, and so the court upon motion ordered that the case be dismissed.
The State appealed, seeking review of the court's ruling that the evidence was not
admissible. The Supreme Court, this time, refused to dismiss the appeal. It specifically
interpreted section 77-18a-l(2)(a) to mean that the State possessed "an appeal of right
from a final judgment of dismissal without any limitation whatsoever. It is wholly
unwarranted to conclude that the prosecution may not raise on appeal the validity of the
suppression order which led to the dismissal." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530. The court also
hastened to add, however, that "The concerns we expressed in Waddoups about potential
manipulation of the right to appeal are still valid." Id. at 531. For that reason, two
conditions were imposed upon the State, both of which must be satisfied whenever the
State wishes appellate review of suppression orders.
First, we will review suppression orders as a matter of right
only if they substantially impair the prosecution from
proceedings with a case. ...We will therefore review
suppression orders on appeal from a dismissal only where
the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed
substantially impairs the prosecution's case.
13

Second, as a further safeguard, we will require the State
to request dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of
suppression orders on an appeal of right from a dismissal
Id. at 531.
The State, in this case, met the second requirement. See R. 60 (trial court's
dismissal with prejudice). But it did not meet the first. The record is devoid of any
certification, by the trial court, that suppression of the methamphetamine and torch
"substantially impaired" the prosecution's ability to proceed. The prosecutor's statement
in his motion to dismiss is not sufficient, even assuming for the sake of argument that it
says what is required. According to Troyer, certification must come from the trial court
rather than the prosecutor for reasons of due process. Id. Because the State failed to
comply with all the requirements of section 77-18a-1(2), as set forth in Troyer, the Court
of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal in this case.
There are, however, additional reasons why this Court should dismiss the State's
appeal, in light of the analysis contained in Waddoups and Troyer.
The State has engaged in the very kind of prosecutorial manipulation that the
Supreme Court criticized so sharply in Waddoups. The State obtained a final judgment
of dismissal from the trial court and now seeks appellate review pursuant to section 7718a-l(2)(a), even though there is every indication that what it really desires to appeal is
not the dismissal order but rather the suppression order. Arguably, a better course of
action for the State to have followed was to appeal the suppression order, as an
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interlocutory decision, pursuant to section 77-18a-l(2)(e). But the State neglected to do
so in a timely manner. Also, of course, the State avoided the necessity of convincing this
Court that its appeal should be granted "in the interest of justice." Such inaction should
not be condoned.
Troyer supports the view that the State preferably should have filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal in this case. The Supreme Court noted that in enacting section 7718a-l the legislature "recognized the utility" of such appeals. Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530.
Indeed, "[t]here are ... instances when the granting of an interlocutory appeal will save
trial time and expense by having certain issues settled and decided by an appellate court
during the course of the trial proceedings." Id. The Supreme Court also observed that
even if the State files a petition, and it is denied, the State's appeal of right at the
conclusion of the case is not affected. Id. For these reasons, the State had nothing to
lose by seeking review of the suppression order as an interlocutory decision, rather than
manipulating the system as it has done.
In not pursuing an interlocutory appeal, the State has sidestepped the process of
demonstrating that its appeal is "in the interest of justice." Further, by not obtaining trial
court certification, the State is unable to show that evidence suppressed "substantially
impaired" the prosecution's ability to proceed. Appellate review of the case therefore is
impossible and should not be granted. Still, even if review took place under Troyer, this
Court properly should come to the conclusion that the case is not appealable on grounds
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that the dismissal of the trial court constituted an acquittal. To come full circle, Willard
trumps Troyer. Or more properly speaking, Willard trumps Troyer in the unique facts
and circumstances of this case.
Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of Troyer is that it did not refer in
any way to Willard, decided three years earlier. Troyer is of course a Supreme Court
case, whereas Willardwas decided by the Court of Appeals. Troyer would seem to be
controlling. If so, there was no need to recognize an inferior court. The holding in
Willard, however, is based squarely on rulings of the United States Supreme Court.
Scott, 437 U.S. at 96-97 (a ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the
defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense charged is an acquittal; a
defendant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the double
jeopardy clause); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (the double jeopardy clause
bars the prosecution from bringing a second action against a defendant when it failed to
muster sufficient evidence to convict him or her in the first action); see also Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1986) (a judgment by the trial court that the
evidence is insufficient to convict constitutes an acquittal.) The holding also is based on
a decision of the Utah Supreme Court. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1064 (a ruling that
constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one or more of the elements
of the offense charged is an acquittal). Thus, Troyer most definitely can and should be
scrutinized using Willard.
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At first blush, Troyer and Willard conflict with one another. Troyer allows the
State to obtain appellate review of adverse suppression orders where such orders
"substantially impair" the prosecution's case. On the other hand, Willard bars appeals
by the State seeking review of suppression orders that have the effect of making it
impossible for the prosecution to proceed against a defendant, specifically because the
particular evidence suppressed is needed to prove an element of the crime charged. The
question that naturally arises is this: Doesn't "substantial impairment" include, as an
obvious example, "inability to proceed" due to insufficiency of admissible evidence
following a suppression hearing?
The answer is no. Troyer and Willard can be harmonized, and in fact they do not
conflict at all. Troyer speaks of "substantial impairment." Such phrasing implies
situations where the State can still prosecute a case, even after an adverse suppression
order, because there is other admissible evidence indicative of guilt. Whether the
evidence would sustain a conviction is irrelevant; the point is, other admissible evidence
exists. This in fact was the situation in Troyer, where, incidentally, defendant was
charged with first degree murder, not garden-variety misdemeanor drug possession. In
dismissing the case, the trial court stated, "If the state's attorney says that he is not able
to proceed with this case, and does not feel that he could secure a conviction on the
remaining evidence, the court has not choice but to dismiss." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 52829 (emphasis added).
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The State, in Troyer, was not faced with the prospect of attempting to prosecute
defendant when all evidence needed to prove guilt was suppressed. But this did happen
in Willard. Willard was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute. The trial court suppressed the contraband found in his vehicle. Thus, the
State could not make out possession, a necessary element of the offense charged. No
other evidence of any kind remained for the State to pursue an action against Willard.
The contraband truly was sine qua non.
For these reasons, Troyer holds that in cases in which only some needed evidence
is suppressed, the State's case is substantially impaired, and the State cannot proceed
against defendant in a manner where conviction is likely, appellate review of the
suppression order of a trial court is possible under section 77-18a-l(2)(e) (interlocutory
appeal) or 77-18a-1 (2)(a) (appeal from final judgment of dismissal). Willard holds that
in cases in which all needed evidence is suppressed, the State's case is vitiated and
rendered unprovable, and the State cannot proceed against defendant in any manner
whatsoever, appellate review is not possible because the trial court in effect has acquitted
defendant and acquittals are not appealable under the section. These two holdings are
completely compatible with one another.
Applying the law to the facts of this case, it is clear that the trial court's
suppression order and subsequent dismissal constituted an acquittal of Mogen. The State
is not entitled to appellate review of the order and dismissal. Accordingly, the State's
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appeal should be dismissed.
II.

Absent dismissal, the Court of Appeals should
affirm the trial court's suppression order. There
was no transition from detention to voluntary
encounter. Rather, Deputy Slaugh detained Mogen
illegally. Slaugh had no reasonable suspicion to
search the truck that Mogen was driving. Mogen's
consent to search was not valid.

Assuming that this Court does not dismiss the State's appeal the narrow issue
presented for review is: Did Slaugh's questioning of Mogen and the request to search the
truck constitute a continuing detention despite the fact that Slaugh had issued Mogen a
verbal warning about speeding and returned his driver's license to him? If so, Fourth
Amendment protections apply. State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). Or, was the encounter between Slaugh and Mogen merely consensual after the
warning and return of the license? If that is true, no constitutional rights are implicated.3

Significantly, the State does not argue in its original brief that despite the
illegality of Mogen's continued detention his consent to search of the truck was in fact
valid. Cf. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,fflf17-25, 17 P.3d 1135, cert, granted, 26
P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). The State, in other words, has defined the salient issue in the
case to be whether Mogen was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when he gave consent, not whether that consent was voluntary and not obtained by
police exploitation of prior illegality. The State has made this a detention case, not a
consent case. As a result, a number of cases that the State cites in support of its position,
e.g. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), are inapposite.
Because the State does not argue that Mogen's consent was valid, even though his
detention at the time of consent was illegal, the State has failed to properly present the
issue for purposes of appeal and this Court may not consider it. i;It is well established
that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. P. 240). Also, a reviewing
court will not address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief, including
19

Id.
It is clear that Slaugh had every right to pull Mogen over because he was speeding.
A police officer is completely justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is "incident to a
traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2 489, 491
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). It is also clear that, when Slaugh stopped Mogen, Mogen was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979). What is not clear, however, is precisely how long that seizure lasted
and when, if ever, Slaugh's contact with Mogen became consensual before Mogen finally
drove off.4 Fortunately, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue that is raised
here. The court stated, "A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter or go about his or her business." State v.
claims of plain error. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995),
cert denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
4

For scholarly discussion of the subject of when traffic stops may cease being
seizures and become consensual encounters, see George M. Dery III, "When Will This
Traffic Stop End? ": The United States Supreme Court's Dodge of Every Detained
Motorist's Central Concern-Ohio v. Robinette, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 519 (1998);
Aaron H. Mendelsohn, Supreme Court Review, The Fourth Amendment and Traffic
Stops: Bright-Line Rules in Conjunction with the Totality of the Circumstances Test,
88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 930 (1998); Ian D. Midgley, Comment, Just One Question
Before We Get to Ohio v. Robinette: "Are You Carrying Any Contraband... Weapons,
Drugs, Constitutional Protections ... Anything Like That?, " 48 Case W. Res. 173
(1997); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(a) (3d ed. 1996).
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Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 466
U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v.
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994); State v. Ramirez, ill P.2d 774, 786
(Utah 1991)). It further stated, "Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the seizure does not cease simply because the police formulate an
uncommunicated intention that the seized person may go his or her way. For the seizure
to end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from the words of an officer or from
the clear import of the circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about his or her
business." Id. (citing Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 540-41).
Here, then, the pertinent question is whether Mogen, as a reasonable person, in
light of all the circumstances at the time, was free to immediately drive off after Slaugh
issued the verbal warning and returned his driver's license, plus refuse Slaugh's virtually
contemporaneous request to search the truck. Mogen concedes that the trial court's
comments, when it granted the motion to suppress, might have been more ample and
specific. The court's written findings of fact likewise might have been more detailed,
though, it must be noted, it was the prosecutor not defense counsel who both asked for
and prepared these findings.5 R. 47-48, 56-59. Nonetheless, this Court can and should

5

In this regard, the State may not obtain appellate review of the case because of
any claimed insufficiency of the trial court's written findings of fact. The State was the
cause of such putative error below. "[W]e will not permit a party to claim error at the
trial level when the part}* asserting the error led the trial court to commit it." State v.
Chapoose, 1999 UT 83. «[ 7, 985 P.2d 915. Indeed, as the State made a conscious
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review the record as it has been offered up, in particular the transcripts of the preliminary
hearing and suppression hearing. The "power of review is strictly limited to the record
presented on appeal." Van Cott v. Wall, 178 P.2d 42, 48 (Utah 1918) (on application
for rehearing). And here, upon review, the record is more than sufficient to show that the
trial court was correct in concluding that Mogen was not free to terminate the encounter
with Slaugh and he was still seized when search of the truck occurred.
A host of factors supports the determination of the trial court that Mogen's seizure
never de-escalated to a consensual encounter. First, because of the hour, that is, a little
after midnight, it was dark and Mogen had limited access to visual and non-visual cues as
to Slaugh's intentions and the meaning of his behavior. The stop occurred on an isolated
stretch of highway. Apparently the only illumination of the scene came from the flashing
overhead emergency lights on Slaugh's patrol car, parked some distance away. Had the
encounter between Slaugh and Mogen occurred in daylight, or a well-lit place at night,
Mogen would have had more opportunity to comprehend the significance of events and
form a clearer picture of whether he was free to leave at a given point in time.
Second, after Slaugh returned Mogen's driver's license, Mogen was not in a
position to leave the scene immediately even if he had wanted to. Mogen had taken out

decision to contest the trial court's suppression order, it had an affirmative duty to ensure
that the court's written findings were sufficiently detailed to allow for review. "Parties
claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to
support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67
(Utah 1993); Utah R. App. P. 1 l(e)(l)-(2).
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log books and was working on them when Slaugh ran the driver's license and warrant
checks. Presumably, he needed some time to complete what he was doing or at the very
least to put the books back where he had found them. Presumably, too, he needed time
to put his driver's license back where he normally kept it.
Third, after giving Mogen his license back, Slaugh himself did not immediately
leave. He did not turn and walk away from the driver's side window. Rather, Slaugh
stayed where he was and stared at Mogen for a few seconds. Mogen felt that he had
something more to say to him.
Fourth, when Slaugh did move, he took only a couple of steps before returning to
where he had been standing. Mere seconds passed. Mogen interpreted Slaugh's body
language, in particular his facial expressions, to mean that Slaugh wanted to continue
talking with him.
Fifth, Slaugh asked Mogen an intrusive and suspicious question.6 He did not say,
"Mind if I have a peek inside the cab?" Instead, he said, u[M]ind if I took a look for any
illegal drugs, guns, knives or bombs?" Such a request, phrased in the manner that it is,
would be very difficult for ordinary citizens to routinely refuse. In fact, many citizens,
especially those driving vehicles that they do not own, would wonder if perhaps police
had knowledge about some illegal activity or hidden danger that should be detected as
soon as possible.

6

See Hansen, 2000 UT 353 at % 24.
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Sixth, Slaugh asked his question immediately after Mogen had been detained for
five to ten minutes, without intervening circumstances of any kind.7
Seventh, Slaugh's question was subtly coercive. Slaugh had only issued Mogen a
verbal warning about speeding. He could have written a ticket, and he still could write
one at the time that the question was asked.8
Eighth, nothing in the record indicates that Slaugh informed Morgen that he might
refuse his request to search the truck.9
Ninth, at the time that Slaugh wanted to search, he retained all the accouterments
of authority that he made use of stopping Slaugh in the first place. In particular, the
overhead emergency lights on Slaugh's patrol vehicle were still flashing.
Tenth, Slaugh made Mogen get out of the truck and stand in front of it until he
completed his search.10

7

See id

9

Cf Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 901 (Pa. 2000) (defendant
already out of vehicle when consent to search given).
On this subject, Mogen does not seek a bright-line rule, which determines per se
the point in time when police detention of a citizen is transformed into a consensual
encounter. The issue is one that properly is decided on the basis of the totality of
circumstances. Nonetheless, Mogen hopes that if this Court reviews and analyzes his
case, it will offer up instruction to police and citizens alike regarding the sometimes gray
area marking the boundary between detentions and consensual encounters.
1C]

Compare Strickler (defendant already out of vehicle when consent to search
given) with Ferris v. Maryland, 735 A.2d 491, 502 (Md. 1999) (after issuance of
speeding ticket defendant removed from vehicle for purposes of questioning and search).
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And eleventh, Mogen believed that he was not free to leave and needed to stay
where he was, immediately following return of his driver's license, because of officer
safety. Mogen did not want to hit Slaugh with the flared side of the truck or the load
that he was carrying. Had Mogen attempted to leave as soon as Slaugh gave him his
license back, as the State suggests that he might have, there apparently could have been
an accident with serious injury or even loss of life.
These are the unique facts and circumstances of the case. None is controlling.
Taken together, however, they necessarily lead to the conclusion that it never was clear
to Mogen, as a seized person, that once he received his verbal warning and got his
driver's license back he was free to decline Slaugh's request to search the truck, then
immediately terminate the encounter with Slaugh and go about his business as before.
The State points to only two facts supporting its position that the contact between
Slaugh and Mogen was consensual in nature when Slaugh asked for permission to search.
They are that Slaugh returned Mogen's license and-supposedly-Slaugh told Mogen that
he was free to leave. In emphasizing these factors, the State ignores the totality of the
circumstances. Further, as the State itself points out in its brief, return of a driver's
documentation does not necessarily render any subsequent interchange consensual "if
the driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave."
United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.
Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord
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United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (and cases cited therein).
Also, it ultimately is immaterial whether or not Slaugh told Mogen that he could leave.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected a bright-line rule, requiring police to
inform detainees that they are free to leave, before an encounter is deemed to be
consensual. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 33-34 (1996). The issue is always factintensive, to be decided on the basis of a totality of circumstances test. Id.
The State attempts to draw a parallel between Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757
P.2d 884 (Pa. 2000), and this case. In Strickler, a police officer stopped and issued
defendant a verbal warning, started to return to his patrol car, changed his mind, walked
back, and asked defendant for permission to search his vehicle. The officer found a
marijuana pipe. The trial court suppressed the evidence. The supreme court reversed.
The facts in Strickler, however, are actually quite different than here. Defendant was out
of his vehicle, urinating on the side of the road, when police approached him and
checked the validity of his driver's license and whether he had outstanding warrants. No
traffic stop occurred. The police officer did not ask defendant to exit his vehicle or direct
his physical movements in any way. In addition, after the officer issued his warning, he
expressly informed defendant of his right to refuse the request to search his vehicle. In
such circumstances, which do not exist in this particular case, the supreme court
concluded that defendant's valid, initial detention de-escalated to a consensual
encounter where no Fourth Amendment rights were implicated.
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Another case that the State cites, People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (111. 1999),
actually supports Mogen's position. The distinction that the State wishes to make,
namely that police stared at defendant's co-passengers "several minutes" while Slaugh
stared at Mogen just a few seconds, is immaterial to the determination of this case
because it is only one circumstance, out of the totality of circumstances, that must be
identified and evaluated. Further, the focus in Brownlee moves beyond the question of
the precise length of defendant's continued detention. The case stands squarely for the
proposition, rooted in federal constitutional law, that following the conclusion of a legal
traffic stop police may not detain a vehicle without reasonable suspicion of any illegal
activity and for any length of time, despite their requesting and receiving permission to
search the vehicle. Id. at 563.
This is the law in Utah. As the Utah Supreme Court has declared, "Once a traffic
stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). Any additional delay is permissible
only on the basis of reasonable suspicion. "Investigative questioning that further detains
the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id.; see also State
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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In this case, after Slaugh issued his verbal warning to Mogen, returned Mogen's
driver's license to him, and started back to his patrol car, he had no reasonable suspicion
to turn around and ask Mogen for permission to search the truck. No evidence of illegal
activity was in plain view. There was no odor of drugs. Mogen did not seem impaired.
Slaugh had not received a tip. In his own words, Slaugh had "no particular reason" for
his request to search. Assuming, then, that Mogen was still seized, because it was not
clear to him that he was free to leave, Mogen's consent to search was given when he was
illegally detained and the protections of the Fourth Amendment most definitely apply.
The trial court concluded, correctly, that the methamphetamine and torch must be
suppressed. Mogen consented to search, but that consent was not valid. It was obtained
while Mogen was still within the arena of the detention of the traffic stop. Slaugh
needed an independent, constitutionally permitted basis for requesting and then carrying
out his search. The court's conclusion as to this matter is grounded in the Fourth
Amendment. Where an illegal detention has occurred, a subsequent consent to search
may be found to have been tainted by the illegality. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501 (citing Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). A consent obtained during an illegal
detention is ineffective to justify an otherwise invalid search. Id.; see also Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1991).
The evidence found in the truck that Mogen was driving is the poisonous fruit of
Mogen's illegal detention and the search that took place. As such, the trial court
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properly suppressed it. On appeal, the State might have argued that the evidence should
not have been suppressed, despite the fact that Mogen's detention was illegal. But the
State has not done so. See fn.3? supra. The State has chosen to insist that Mogen9s
consent to search was valid because, at the time of consent, his encounter with Slaugh
was consensual, not that the consent was valid because it satisfied the tests set forth in
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), and its progeny including State v. Ham,
910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The State therefore has waived the right to
contest the trial court's determination that evidence in the truck must be suppressed
because such evidence is tainted. The waiver is fatal as regards the State's appeal. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that "when a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth
Amendment violation, the evidence obtained from the search must be excluded unless
the state proves that the consent was voluntary and that it was not obtained by exploiting
the violation." State v. Shoulder blade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995) (citing Arroyo,
796 P.2d at 688). The State has not proven, or even attempted to prove, that Mogen's
consent was voluntary and not obtained by exploitation of prior illegality, within the
legal meaning of those phrases.
From start to finish this is a detention case. The issue is whether Slaugh's
detention of Mogen ever de-escalated to a consensual encounter. The State argues that
there was such an encounter, beginning when Slaugh returned Mogen's license and
allegedly told Mogen he was free to go and continuing during the time Slaugh sought and
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received permission to search the truck. The State has gone to great lengths in advancing
its argument, citing United States Supreme Court cases along with cases from federal and
state jurisdictions throughout the country. An irony, of course, is that legal argument of
the type presented is well beyond the ken of ordinary citizens, who in fact have little or
no idea of their rights when stopped by police on the highway. They are not attorneys,
much less constitutional scholars. They are, then, very much at risk in encounters with
police. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Robinette, before the case ultimately was
decided by the United States Supreme Court, "The transition between detention and a
consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has
occurred. The undetectability of that transition may be used by police officers to coerce
citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a
vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow." State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695,
698 (Ohio 1995).
No one knows what was going on in Deputy Slaugh's mind. But consciously or
unconsciously, deliberately or accidentally, Slaugh attempted a seamless, undetectable
transition from detention to consensual encounter when interacting with Mogen. Mogen
was alone at the time. He had no one to offer legal advice and guidance. Now, however,
Mogen has this Court. He believes that this Court should affirm the trial court's
suppression order, based on something that he probably did not know about or at least
had not thought about much, that is, the Fourth Amendment of the United States
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Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It protects citizens, not the police. And it should protect Mogen in this case.
There was no transition from detention to consensual encounter. Slaugh needed but did
not have reasonable suspicion to search the truck that Mogen was driving. Mogen's
consent was the product of unlawful detention and not valid. Evidence found in the
truck must be suppressed.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal. Alternatively, the Court
should affirm the trial court's suppression order and subsequent dismissal of the case.
DATED this ^

day of December, 2001.

WESLEY M.BADEN
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee
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ADDENDUM

GENERAL PROVISIONS
COLI,A:TK \\ uryyuv\
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 1,37.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 20.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14.
A.L.R. — Lesser-related state offense instructions: modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081.
Various acts of weapons violations as separate or continuing offense, 80 A.L.R.4th 631

76-1-403
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Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the
stolen property, 29 A.L.R.5th 59.
Seizure or detention for purpose of committing rape, robbery, or other offense as constituting separate crime of kidnapping, 39 A.L.R.5th
283.
Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge to
jury in federal prosecution for crime involving
property rights, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 669.
Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in
federal prosecution of narcotics defendant, 106
VL.R Fed. 236.

76-1-403. F o r m e r prosecution b a r r i n g subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
t h a t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence
to w a r r a n t conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
t h a t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termiilation takes
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with the law; or
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76-1-403

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
was not the equivalent of consenting to termination of trial, which would have allowed the
state to retry defendant on the same charges.
State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

ANALYSIS

Acquittal.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Consent to termination.
Evaluation.
Mistrial.
Severed counts.
Cited.
Acquittal.
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's
case that "the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case on. any
of the remaining counts of the information" and
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Conduct c o n s t i t u t i n g s i n g l e crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense when
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's concurrent possession of marijuana paraphernalia and methamphetamine
satisfied the temporal requirement of the single
criminal episode statute but, because separate
statutory offenses were involved, the possession did not satisfy the "same criminal objective" requirement. State v. Keppler, 976 R2d 99
(Utah Ct. App. 1999).
C o n s e n t to termination.
Lack of objection to state's motion to dismiss

Evaluation.
Both the sequence of events leading to a trial
termination, and the equivocation or ambiguity
of a defendant's response, are important factors
to consider in determining whether reprosecution is permissible. State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d
1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Mistrial.
Trial court's order of a mistrial was proper
based on its determination, borne out by the
record, that defendant acted contrary to the
court's instructions throughout the proceedings. State v. Castle. 951 P.2d 1109 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
Severed counts.
This section does not mandate dismissal if
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice"
and the district court later refused to rejoin
them for the same reason after defendant had
been convicted on one of the counts, the case
was not one that "should have been tried under
§ 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987).
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah
1987); State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 347 et seq.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 208.
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one
person as bar to subsequent prosecution for
robbery of another person committed at the

same time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693.
Determination that state failed to prove
charges relied upon for revocation of probation
as barring subsequent criminal action based on
same underlying charges, 2 A.L.R.5th 262.
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• History: C. 1953, 77-18-15, e n a c t e d b y L.
|lfc/*, ch. 143, § 7; 1995, c h . 286, § 2; 1999,
fth :27, § 6.
/ t n e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amend<. . i, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection
|(i; and redesignated the following subsections
| £;•; idingly.
I V a 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999,
<J Ujd former Subsection (2), which read "The
*•••i.-.ion may charge a petitioner a reasonable

18-16.
i

i 7 1 8a. 1

fee for processing an expungement order under
Section 63-38-3," made a stylistic change, and
redesignated subsections accordingly For fee
provisions, see § 77-18-11(2).
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Board of Pardons and
Parole, § 77-27-2.
Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, § 58-1-103.
Peace Officer Standards and Training Division, § 53-6-103.

Penalty.

Any person who willfully violates any prohibition in this chapter is guilty of
A,iss A misdemeanor.
history: C. 1953, 77-18-16, e n a c t e d b y I ,
1, ch. 143, § 8.

;

V / 18- 1 ' 3

Retroacti % e applicatioi I.

The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to
ail arrests and convictions regardless of the date on which the arrests were
i jde or convictions were entered.
ilistory: C. 1953, 77-18-17. ena< it-ri l.v \
' i ' U , ch. 143, § 9,

CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
r.etion
W-18a-l.
W-18a-2.

Appeals — When proper.
Capital cases.

/7-18a-l. Appeals — When proper,
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
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(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice;
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsection (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides
t h a t the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, e n a c t e d by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 10; 1995, ch. 65, § 1; 1997, ch.
364, $ 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the phrase
beginning "including a dismissal" to Subsection
(2Xa).

The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
added Subsection (2)(f) and made related stylistic changes.
Compiler's
Notes. — This
chapter
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appealability.
Appeal by defendant.
Appeal by prosecution.
Arrest of judgment.
Bind over orders.
Death penalty cases.
"Dismissal."
Double jeopardy.
Habeas corpus ruling.
Oral statements from bench.
Suppression orders.
Cited.
Appealability.
To determine whether an appeal falls within
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate
court looks to the substance of the ruling and
not to the label attached by a trial judge. State
v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.),
affd, 852 R2d 981 (Utah 1993).
A p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t .
A purported second judgment and sentence,
which was clearly an attempt to render a judgment in criminal proceeding which if valid
would have affected defendant's rights, was
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14,
3 8 6 P . 2 d 4 1 1 (1963).
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights protected by the double jeopardy guarantee necessitate review on appeal before a second trial if
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 R2d 354 (Utah
1979).
Appeal by p r o s e c u t i o n .
District court's judgment, discharging defen-

dant in criminal prosecution and releasing his
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was
final judgment from which state might appeal.
State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899).
State had right of appeal from judgment,
discharging defendant, in prosecution for
felony, on ground that information did not state
facts sufficient to constitute public offense.
State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317. 67 P. 815
(1902).
The state had no right to appeal sentence
imposed upon defendant since the imposition of
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an
order made after judgment. State v. Kelbach,
569 R2d 1100 (Utah 1977).
Former section did not authorize the prosecution to appeal an acquittal, no matter how
overwhelming the evidence against the defen-:
dant mav be. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Where dismissal of charge was based on trial
court's construction of the applicable law before
the court ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, the ruling was. in effect, a
"final judgment of dismissal" and therefore was •
appealable even though the ruling was made at;
the close of all the evidence. State v.Musselman, 667 R2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
"2
The state may not, following a pretrial ruling
suppressing some state's evidence, request dia-j
missal of a criminal case in order to avoid the*
discretionary appeal provisions and to obtain,
an appeal of right. State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2<L
223 (Utah 1985).
|
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the]
ground that the prosecution has not proved anl
element of the offense beyond a reasonable!
doubt is in substance an acquittal and therefore
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